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File Photo: Saudi Arabia's King Salman holds talks with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi
on June 18, 2017 / Source: SPA
Since King Salman ascended to the Saudi throne three years ago, Riyadh’s foreign policy
has become increasingly muscular, underscored by the ongoing Yemen and Qatar crises.
The rise of Iranian influence in the Middle East has been the prime factor driving this Saudi
approach to regional issues. Of all the political fronts where Riyadh is attempting to counter
Tehran, the Saudis have managed to achieve a significant degree of success in Iraq. 
The invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 by the United States and the U.K. changed the
fortunes of the country’s Shi’ite political forces. Soon after Saddam Hussein fell, Shi’ite
factions emerged as the dominant power component in Iraqi politics. Iran managed to
leverage this shift by influencing different Shi’ite blocks to coalesce and form a government.
During the successive governments of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iran became the
prime player in Iraqi politics. 
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Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia did not assertively contest Iran’s involvement in Iraq. Although
Sunnis constitute Iraq’s second largest polity, their influence in Iraqi politics has been on the
decline since 2003. This has been partially due to a reluctance of regional Sunni powers—
specifically Saudi Arabia—to engage in Iraq and to support the political interests of Iraqi
Sunnis. Saudi Arabia had traditionally maintained links with Sunni tribal elites in the Anbar
province. Yet this engagement was never strategic in nature and did not change the
political fortunes of Iraqi Sunnis. Riyadh had practically given up on Iraq and, until recently,
considered its government an Iranian proxy.
King Salman and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS) have
effectively changed Riyadh’s strategies and have launched a ‘charm offensive’ to connect
with Iraq’s present government. This shift is due partially to Haider Abadi’s rise to the rank
of Iraqi prime minister. Abadi has taken a somewhat nationalistic stance on political issues
concerning Baghdad and has positively engaged with all of Iraq’s neighbors. This mutual
willingness to improve the relationship resulted in Saudi Arabia appointing its first
ambassador to Iraq since Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Relations entered into
troubled waters again, however, when Iraq’s government requested that Saudi Arabia
replace the Kingdom’s ambassador following his controversial statements. Saudis acted
pragmatically and recalled their ambassador but did not suspend their diplomatic
representation in Iraq. 
The strain in bilateral ties created by the Saudi ambassador’s ouster gradually eased. Visits
by Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, Iraq’s Interior Minister Qasim Al-Araji, as well as
by Abadi, were instrumental to this end. Moreover, the Saudis realized that the enormous
power of Shi’ite militant groups in Iraq could not be countered openly but instead required a
pragmatic policy of a deeper engagement that included nationalistic elements. 
The defeat of Islamic State in Mosul and other Iraqi cities by Iraqi security forces has further
prompted Baghdad and Riyadh to move toward rapprochement. Saudi Arabia has a unique
opportunity to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq’s major Sunni areas, thereby
obtaining stakes in future relations between the country’s Shi’ite polity and the Sunni
minority. This dynamic, coupled with the reality that numerous Iraqi officials are seeking to
assert Baghdad’s independence from Tehran’s foreign policy and espouse an increasingly
nationalistic political discourse in Iraq’s post-ISIS chapter, may ultimately enable Riyadh to
achieve some degree of success in terms of limiting Iran’s role in Iraq. 
For the first time in eleven years, prominent Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr visited Riyadh
last July, where he agreed with the Saudi leadership on the goal of peaceful coexistence
and cooperation for the achievement of common interests. Saudi Arabia already enjoys
cordial ties with prominent Iraqi politician and Vice President Iyad Allawi, who had accused
Iran of interfering in Iraq.
Saudis are focusing not only on forging political ties with Iraq but also on strengthening
bilateral trade and economic links. Officials in Riyadh realize that a long-term relationship
with Iraq can be viable only if it is rooted in an economic partnership. Saudi Arabia’s chargé
d’affaires in Baghdad has stressed that his priority was to promote economic engagement
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between the two states while initiating interaction between business elites on both sides.
Within this context, Saudi Arabia finally decided to appoint a full-time ambassador to Iraq.
Riyadh is aware that the prospects for limiting Iranian influence in Iraq will be more realistic
once Saudi Arabia plays its political and economic cards in the correct combination and at
the right time. This opportune moment appears to be the Iraqi elections of 2018. There has
been a convergence of interests on the part of both Iraqi political entities and the Kingdom
with MbS at the helm. Riyadh ultimately wants an Iraq which is ruled by the likes of Abadi,
Allawi, Sadr, and Hakim - not Iran-allied players. Moreover, a major concern for Saudi
Arabia is the host of heavily armed Shi’ite militias, some of which operate close to the
Kingdom’s border with Iraq and are seen in Riyadh as a grave threat to Saudi Arabia’s
national security. This threat can be further institutionalized if these actors are able to
politically cash in their victories against Islamic State in the upcoming elections. The
success of political entities trying to assert more independence from the Islamic Republic
may create, however, a new political landscape in Iraq which is far more favorable to
Riyadh’s long-term interests.
Gulf State Analytics published this article on January 14, 2018
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